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Abstract 
 
In this paper, we investigate whether superior performance on corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) strategies leads to better access to finance.  We hypothesize that better access to finance 
can be attributed to a) reduced agency costs due to enhanced stakeholder engagement and b) 
reduced informational asymmetry due to increased transparency. Using a large cross-section of 
firms, we find that firms with better CSR performance face significantly lower capital constraints. 
Moreover, we provide evidence that both of the hypothesized mechanisms, better stakeholder 
engagement  and  transparency  around  CSR  performance,  are  important  in  reducing  capital 
constraints.  The  results  are  further  confirmed  using  several  alternative  measures  of  capital 
constraints, a paired analysis based on a ratings shock to CSR performance, an instrumental 
variables and also a simultaneous equations approach. Finally, we show that the relation is driven 
by both the social and the environmental dimension of CSR.  
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INTRODUCTION 
In recent decades, a growing number of academics as well as top executives have been allocating 
a considerable amount of time and resources to Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) strategies 
–  i.e.  the  voluntary  integration  of  social  and  environmental  concerns  in  their  companies’ 
operations and in their interaction with stakeholders (European Commission, 2001). According 
to  the  latest  UN  Global  Compact  –  Accenture  CEO  study  (2010),  93  percent  of  the  766 
participant CEOs from all over the world declared CSR as an “important” or “very important” 
factor  for  their  organizations’  future  success.
1  Despite  this  large  amount  of  attention,  a 
fundamental question still remaining unanswered is whether CSR leads to value creation, and if 
so, in what ways? The extant research so far has failed to give a definitive answer (Margolis, 
Elfenbein and Walsh, 2007). In this paper, we argue for and provide empirical evidence for one 
specific mechanism through which CSR may generate value in the long-run: by lowering the 
idiosyncratic  constraints  that  a  firm  faces  in  financing  operations  and  strategic  projects  and 
allowing it to undertake profitable investments that it would otherwise bypass.   
In this study, by “capital constraints” we refer to those market frictions that may prevent 
a firm from funding all desired (i.e. NPV-positive) investments. This inability to obtain finance 
may be “due to credit constraints or inability to borrow, inability to issue equity, dependence on 
bank  loans,  or  illiquidity  of  assets”  (Lamont  et  al.,  2001).  Prior  studies  found  that  capital 
constraints play an important role in strategic decision-making by directly affecting the firm’s 
ability to undertake major investment decisions (Stein, 2003) and also, by influencing the firm’s 
capital structure choices (e.g., Hennessy and Whited, 2007). Moreover, capital constraints are 
associated with a firm’s subsequent stock market performance (e.g. Lamont et al., 2001).  
                                                            
1 “A New Era of Sustainability. UN Global Compact-Accenture CEO Study 2010” last accessed July 28
th, 2010 at: 
(https://microsite.accenture.com/sustainability/research_and_insights/Pages/A-New-Era-of-Sustainability.aspx) Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1847085
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The thesis of this paper is that firms with better CSR performance face lower capital 
constraints. This is due to several reasons.  First, superior CSR performance is linked to better 
stakeholder engagement, limiting the likelihood of short-term opportunistic behavior (Benabou 
and Tirole, 2010; Eccles et al., 2012) and as a result reducing overall contracting costs (Jones, 
2005).  Second,  firms  with  better  CSR  performance  are  more  likely  to  disclose  their  CSR 
activities to the market (Dhaliwal et al., 2011) to signal their long-term focus and differentiate 
themselves  (Spence,  1973;  Benabou  and  Tirole,  2010).  CSR  reporting  creates  a  positive 
feedback  loop:  a)  increases  transparency  around  the  social  and  environmental  impact  of 
companies, and their governance structure and b) may change the internal control system that 
further improves the compliance with regulations and the reliability of reporting. Therefore, the 
increased availability and quality of data about the firm reduces the informational asymmetry 
between the firm and investors (e.g. Botosan, 1997; Khurana and Raman, 2004; Hail and Leuz, 
2006; Chen et al., 2009; El Ghoul et al., 2011), leading to lower capital constraints (Hubbard, 
1998). In sum, because of lower agency costs through stakeholder engagement and increased 
transparency through CSR reporting, we hypothesize that a firm with superior CSR performance 
will face lower capital constraints.   
To investigate the impact of CSR on capital constraints, we use a panel data set from 
Thompson Reuters ASSET4 for 2,439 publicly listed firms during the period 2002 to 2009. 
Thompson Reuters ASSET4 rates firms’ performance on three dimensions (“pillars”) of CSR: 
social, environmental and corporate governance. The main dependent variable of interest is the 
“KZ index”, first advocated by Kaplan and Zingales (1997) and subsequently used extensively in 
the corporate finance literature (e.g. Lamont et al., 2001; Baker et al., 2003; Almeida et al., 2004; 
Bakke and Whited, 2010; Hong et al., 2011) as a measure of capital constraints.  4 
 
The  results  confirm  that  firms  with  superior  CSR  performance  face  lower  capital 
constraints. We test and confirm the robustness of the results in several ways. First, we substitute 
the KZ index with several other measures of capital constraints including an indicator variable 
for stock repurchase activity, an equal-weighted KZ index, the SA Index (Hadlock and Pierce, 
2010), and the WW Index (Whitted and Wu, 2006). Moreover, we construct measures and test 
empirically for the two hypothesized mechanisms – stakeholder engagement and CSR disclosure 
- and we find that both variables are significantly related to capital constraints in the predicted 
direction. Furthermore, in subsample analysis, we find that the link between CSR performance 
and capital constraints is economically larger and highly significant for the subsample of firms 
that are most capital constrained contradicting, as we explain, the argument that CSR is a “luxury 
good”. Importantly, the results remain unchanged when we use the introduction of ESG ratings 
as  a  shock  to  CSR  performance  (Chatterji  and  Toffel,  2010)  and  subsequently  investigate 
changes  in  the  CSR  Index  and  capital  constraints  for  a  paired  sample  of  firms.  We  also 
implement a two-stage feasible efficient Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimation 
and a three-stage least squares simultaneous equations model with validity-tested instruments, 
mitigating potential endogeneity concerns or correlated omitted variables issues and increasing 
confidence  in  the  directionality  of  our  results.  Finally,  we  explore  the  impact  of  the  three 
components of CSR individually and find that the impact on capital constraints is driven by both 
social and environmental performance, suggesting that both social and environmental issues are 
relevant for investors.  
Corporate Social Responsibility 
Numerous studies have investigated the link between CSR and financial performance through a 
theoretical as well as an empirical lens. In particular, research rooted in neoclassical economics 5 
 
argued that CSR unnecessarily raises a firm’s costs, putting the firm in a position of competitive 
disadvantage vis-à-vis its competitors (Friedman, 1970; Aupperle et al., 1985; McWilliams and 
Siegel, 1997; Jensen, 2002). Predominantly based on agency theory, some studies have argued 
that  employing  valuable  firm  resources  to  engage  in  CSR  results  in  significant  managerial 
benefits rather than financial benefits to the firm’s shareholders (Brammer and Millington, 2008). 
   In contrast, other scholars have argued that CSR can have a positive impact by providing 
better access to valuable resources (Cochran and Wood, 1984; Waddock and Graves, 1997), 
attracting and retaining higher quality employees (Turban and Greening, 1997; Greening and 
Turban,  2000),  allowing  for  better  marketing  of  products  and  services  (Moskowitz,  1972; 
Fombrun,  1996),  creating  unforeseen  opportunities  (Fombrun  et  al.,  2000),  and  contributing 
towards gaining social legitimacy (Hawn et al., 2011). Furthermore, CSR may function in similar 
ways as advertising does, increasing demand for products and services and/or reducing consumer 
price  sensitivity  (Dorfman  and  Steiner,  1954;  Navarro,  1988;  Sen  and  Bhattacharya,  2001; 
Milgrom and Roberts, 1986) and even enabling firms to develop intangible assets (Gardberg and 
Fomburn, 2006; Hull and Rothernberg, 2008; Waddock and Graves, 1997). From a stakeholder 
theory perspective (Freeman, 1984; Freeman et al., 2007; Freeman et al., 2010), which suggests 
that CSR includes managing multiple stakeholder ties concurrently, scholars have argued that 
CSR can mitigate the likelihood of negative regulatory, legislative or fiscal action (Freeman, 
1984;  Berman  et  al.,  1999;  Hillman  and  Keim,  2001),  attract  socially  conscious  consumers 
(Hillman  and  Keim,  2001),  or  attract  financial  resources  from  socially  responsible  investors 
(Kapstein, 2001).  
  Empirical work investigating the link between CSR and corporate financial performance, 
measured by various accounting or stock market measures, has resulted in contradictory findings, 6 
 
ranging from a positive to a negative relation, to a U-shaped or even to an inverse-U shaped 
relation  (Margolis  and  Walsh,  2003;  Margolis,  Elfenbein  and  Walsh,  2007).  According  to 
McWilliams  and  Siegel  (2000),  such  conflicting  results  were  due  to  “several  important 
theoretical and empirical limitations” (p.603) of prior studies; some have argued that prior work 
suffered from “stakeholder mismatching” (Wood and Jones, 1995), the neglect of “contingency 
factors”  (e.g.  Ullmann,  1985),  “measurement  errors”  (e.g.  Waddock  and  Graves,  1997)  and, 
omitted variable bias (Aupperle et al., 1985; Cochran and Wood, 1984; Ullman, 1985). 
  More recent work focuses on understanding the role of capital markets as an intermediate 
mechanism though which CSR can create long-term value. For example, Lee and Faff (2009) 
show that firms with high CSR scores have lower idiosyncratic risk, while Goss (2009) shows 
that  firms  with  low  CSR  scores  are  more  likely  to  experience  financial  distress.  Moreover, 
Ioannou  and  Serafeim  (2010a)  show  a  positive  impact  of  CSR  on  sell-side  analysts’ 
recommendations while Goss and Roberts (2011) find that firms with the worst CSR scores pay 
between 7 and 18 basis points more on their bank debt compared to firms with higher scores. 
Relatedly, Dhaliwal et al. (2011) find that the voluntary disclosure of CSR activities leads to a 
reduction  in  the  firm’s  cost  of  capital,  while  attracting  dedicated  institutional  investors  and 
analyst coverage.  El Ghoul et al. (2011) focus on a sample of US firms and find that firms with 
better CSR scores exhibit lower cost of equity capital. 
In  this  paper,  we  contribute  to  this  emerging  literature  that  investigates  the  relation 
between capital markets and socially responsible firms by focusing on the critical impact that 
CSR has on idiosyncratic firm capital constraints. Unlike prior studies that mainly focused on US 
firms only, our findings are based on a broad sample of firms originating from 49 countries. 
Moreover our study adds to prior work by considering other forms of capital constrains beyond 7 
 
the cost of equity or debt, including the inability to borrow, the inability to issue equity, the 
dependence on bank loans, or the illiquidity of assets (Lamont et al., 2001). More importantly, 
this paper identifies the mechanisms through which better CSR performance contributes to lower 
capital constraints. As we explain in the following section, understanding the impact of CSR on 
capital constraints is important given that prior literature has documented the key role of capital 
constraints in strategic investment decisions (Stein, 2003).  
Capital Constraints 
Companies  undertake  profitable  (i.e.  NPV-positive)  investments  with  the  goal  of  achieving 
superior  performance  and  competitive  advantage.  The  ability  to  finance  such  strategic 
investments though is directly linked to the idiosyncratic capital constraints that each firm faces.   
The investment function is derived from the firm's profit-maximizing optimization and postulates 
that  investment  depends  on  the  marginal  productivity  of  capital,  interest  rate,  and  tax  rules 
(Summers  et.  al.,  1981;  Mankiw,  2009).  As  Stein  (2003)  notes,  according  to  this  paradigm 
“nothing else should matter: not the firm’s mix of debt and equity financing, nor its reserves of 
cash and securities, nor financial market ‘conditions’, however defined” (p.125). Yet subsequent 
studies that examine equity and debt markets show that cash flow (i.e. a firm’s internal funds) 
also plays a key role in determining the firm’s level of investment (Blundell et. al., 1992; Whited, 
1992; Hubbard and Kashyap 1992). Importantly, some studies show that financially constrained 
firms are more likely to diminish investments in a wide range of strategic activities (Hubbard, 
1998; Campello et al., 2010), including investments in inventory (Carpenter et al., 1998) as well 
as investments in R&D activities (Himmelberg and Petersen, 1994; Hall and Lerner, 2010), in 
pricing  for market  share (Chevalier, 1995) and in  labor hoarding during recessions  (Sharpe, 
1994), thus significantly and adversely the capacity of the firm to grow over time.  8 
 
  In  terms  of  firm  survival  and  performance  moreover,  it  is  critical  to  understand  that 
capital constrained firms are forced to forgo investments that they would otherwise make. In 
other words, these are investment opportunities that are profitable (i.e. NPV-positive) yet they 
are not pursued due to financing frictions. It follows then that, all else equal, the relaxation of 
capital  constraints  for  such  firms  would  enable  them  to  undertake  otherwise  profitable 
investments and, in expectation at least, to improve their performance. Recently for example, 
Faulkender  and  Petersen  (2012)  use  the  American  Jobs  Creation  Act  (AJCA)  of  2004  as  a 
temporary shock to the cost of internal financing, and find that indeed AJCA resulted in large 
increases in investment but only among the subset of firms which were capital constrained (p. 2).   
  A second set of studies has explored how capital constraints affect the firm’s entry and 
exit decisions into markets or industries. More specifically, using personal tax-return data on 
entrepreneurs, Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian, and Rosen (1994a) find that the size of an individual’s 
inheritance – regarded as an exogenous shock to one’s wealth – had a significant positive effect 
on the probability of becoming an entrepreneur. A follow-up paper (Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian, and 
Rosen 1994b) shows that firms founded by entrepreneurs with a larger inheritance (thus, lower 
capital constraints) are also more likely to survive. Aghion, Fally and Scarpetta (2007) document 
a similar mechanism using firm-level data from 16 economies, comparing new firm entry and 
their subsequent post-entry growth trajectory. 
  A  third  stream  of  literature  accounting  for  both    incumbents  and  new  entrants  (see 
Levine (2005) for a comprehensive review) argues that capital constraints affect smaller, newer 
and riskier firms relatively more, channeling capital to where the marginal return is highest. As a 
result,  countries  with  better-functioning  financial  systems  that  can  ease  such  constraints, 
experience  faster  industrial  growth.  Given  the  idiosyncratic  levels  of  constraints  faced  by 9 
 
companies of various sizes, scholars turned to capital constraints as an explanation for why small 
companies pay lower dividends, become more highly levered and grow more slowly (Cooley and 
Quadrini 2001; Cabral and Mata 2003). For example, Carpenter and Petersen (2002) show that 
the asset growth of small U.S. firms is constrained by their internal capital, and that firms who 
are able to raise additional external funds enjoy a higher growth rate. Becchetti and Trovato 
(2002) find qualitatively similar results using a sample of Indian firms, and Desai, Foley and 
Forbes (2008) confirm the same relation in a currency crisis setting. Finally, Beck et al. (2005), 
using  survey  data  from  global  companies,  document  that  firm  performance  is  vulnerable  to 
various financial constraints and that small companies are disproportionately affected due to 
tighter limitations. In sum, the literature to date has revealed that seeking ways to relax capital 
constraints is crucial to the firm-level survival and growth, industry-level expansion and even 
country-level development. 
The Link between CSR and Capital Constraints 
Based on neoclassical economic assumptions that postulate a flat supply curve for funds in the 
capital market at the level of the risk-adjusted real interest rate, Hennessy and Whited (2007) 
argue that “a CFO can neither create nor destroy value through his financing decisions in a world 
without frictions”. However, in reality, the supply curve for funds is effectively upward sloping 
rather than horizontal - at levels of capital that exceed the firm’s net worth –because of market 
imperfections such as informational asymmetries (Greenwald, Stiglitz and Weiss 1984; Myers 
and Majluf 1984) and agency costs (Bernanke and Gertler 1989, 1990). In other words, when the 
likelihood  of  agency  costs  is  high  and  the  amount  of  capital  that  the  firm  requires  for 
investments exceeds its  net worth (and it is therefore uncollateralized), capital providers  are 
compensated for their information (and/or monitoring) costs through pricing capital a higher 10 
 
interest rate.
2 Consequently, the greater these market frictions are, the steeper the supply curve 
and the higher the cost of external financing.  
It  follows then,  that  the  adoption and implementation of   firm strategies that reduce 
informational asymmetries or reduce the likelihood of agency costs make the supply curve for 
funds effectively less steep.  Therefore, better access to funds lowers the idiosyncratic capital 
constraints the firm is facing,  favorably impacting  its  strategic objectives  by allowing  it to 
undertake  major  investment s  that  would  not  otherwise  have  been  profitable,  and/or  by 
influencing the capital structure choices of the firm (e.g., Hennessy and Whited, 2007). 
We argue that the adoption and implementation of CSR strategies that lead to superior  
CSR performance result in lower idiosyncratic capital constraints for the firm because of two 
complementary mechanisms. First, superior CSR performance captures the firm’s commitment 
to and engagement with stakeholders on the basis of mutual trust and cooperation (Jones, 1995; 
Andriof and Waddock, 2002). Consequently, as Jones (1995) argues, “because ethical solutions 
to commitment problems are more efficient than mechanisms designed to curb opportunism, it 
follows  that  firms  that  contract  with  their  stakeholders  on  the  basis  of  mutual  trust  and 
cooperation […] will experience reduced agency costs, transaction costs and costs associated 
with  team  production”.  Such  agency  and  transaction  costs  according  to  Jones  (2005)  would 
include  “monitoring  costs,  bonding  costs,  search  costs,  warranty  costs  and  residual  losses.” 
Moreover,  superior  engagement  with  stakeholders  can  enhance  a  firm’s  revenue  or  profit 
generation – also contributing towards the persistence of superior profitability (Choi and Wang, 
2009) – through higher quality of relationship with customers, business partners and among 
employees; which in turn improves interaction with customers and new product development.
3 In 
                                                            
2 For a full exposition of the model, based on neoclassical assumptions, see Hubbard (1998), p. 195-198. 
3 We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this point. 11 
 
other words, superior stakeholder engagement may directly limit the likelihood of short-term 
opportunistic behavior (Benabou and Tirole, 2010; Eccles et al., 2012), and it also represents a 
more  efficient  form  of  contracting  with  key  stakeholders  (Jones,  1995)  that  could  lead  to 
enhanced revenue or profit generation, which in turn is rewarded by the markets.  
 Secondly, prior studies have shown that firms with superior CSR performance are more 
likely to publicly disclose their CSR strategies by issuing sustainability reports (Dhaliwal et al., 
2011) and are also more likely to provide assurance of such reports by third parties, therefore 
increasing the credibility of such reports (Simnett et al., 2009). Consequently, CSR reporting: a) 
increases transparency with regards to the social and environmental impact of companies, and 
their governance structure and b) may lead to changes in internal control system that further 
improves  the  compliance  with  regulations  and  the  reliability  of  reporting.  As  a  result,  the 
extended availability of credible data about the firm’s CSR strategies, in addition to its financial 
disclosures, further  reduces  informational  asymmetry  and  results  in lower  capital  constraints 
(Hubbard, 1998). Moreover, the resulting changes in internal managerial practices (Ioannou and 
Serafeim, 2011) may also reduce the likelihood of agency costs in the form of short-termism. 
To summarize, we postulate that firms with superior CSR performance will face lower 
idiosyncratic  capital  constraints  because  of  two  mechanisms:  a)  reduced  agency  costs  and 
revenue/profit generating potential resulting from more effective stakeholder engagement and b) 
reduced  informational  asymmetry  resulting  from  more  extended  and  more  credible  CSR 
disclosure practices and transparency. 
DATA AND SAMPLE 
Dependent Variable: The KZ index of capital constraints 12 
 
We follow the extant literature in corporate finance (e.g. Lamont et al. 2001; Almeida et al., 
2004; Bakke and Whited, 2010) in measuring the level of capital constraints by constructing the 
KZ index for every firm-year pair in our sample utilizing estimates from Kaplan and Zingales 
(1997). As reported in Lamont et al. (2001), Kaplan and Zingales (1997) classified firms into 
discrete categories of capital constraints and then employed an ordered logit specification to 
relate  their  classifications  to  accounting  variables.  Consistent  with  prior  literature,  in  our 
empirical approach, we use their regression coefficients to construct the KZ index in every year 
and for each firm, consisting of a linear combination of five accounting ratios: a) cash flow to 
total capital, b) the market to book ratio, c) debt to total capital, d) dividends to total capital, and 
e) cash holdings to capital. Higher values of the KZ index imply that the firm is more capital 
constrained (see part I of the appendix for a more detailed exposition). 
As a robustness check, we also construct an equally-weighted KZ index, where the five 
accounting variables still enter the specification linearly, but they are assigned equal weights (as 
opposed to being weighted with the Kaplan and Zingales (1997) estimates). Furthermore, and in 
light of recent criticism of the KZ Index in the corporate finance literature (e.g. Hadlock and 
Pierce, 2010) we use three alternative measures of capital constraints as follows: a) an indicator 
variable  for  the  absence  of  stock  repurchase  activity  (Hong  et  al.  2011),  b)  the  SA  Index 
suggested by Hadlock and Pierce (2010), and c) the WW Index suggested by Whitted and Wu 
(2006). All of our firm-level data were collected from Worldscope. We winsorize each of the 
five elements of the KZ index at the 99 percentile to avoid extreme ratios. We follow the same 
procedure when we construct the SA and the WW index of capital constraints. 
Independent Variables: Measuring CSR and the Thomson Reuters ASSET4 Dataset
4  
                                                            
4 This section draws extensively from various public documents found at the firm’s website (www.asset4.com) as 
well as personal communication with our contacts at the firm. 13 
 
Prior studies have suggested a number of measures for CSR performance: forced-choice survey 
instruments  (Aupperle,  1991;  Aupperle  et  al.,  1985),  the  Fortune  reputational  and  social 
responsibility index or Moskowitz’ reputational scales (Bowman and Haire, 1975; McGuire et al., 
1988; Preston and O'Bannon, 1997), content analysis of corporate documents (Wolfe, 1991), 
behavioral  and  perceptual  measures  (Wokutch  and  McKinney,  1991),  and  case  study 
methodologies (Clarkson, 1991). 
  For our empirical analysis, and to measure CSR performance, we use a panel dataset with 
environmental,  social  and  governance  (ESG)  performance  scores  obtained  from  Thomson 
Reuters  ASSET4;  a  Swiss-based  company  that  specializes  in  providing  objective,  relevant, 
auditable and systematic ESG information and investment analysis tools to professional investors 
who  built  their  portfolios  by  integrating  ESG  (non-financial)  data  into  their  traditional 
investment analysis. It is estimated that investors representing more than €2.5trillion assets under 
management use the ASSET4 data, including prominent investment houses such as BlackRock. 
Specially trained research analysts collect 900 evaluation points per firm, where all the primary 
data used must be objective and publically available. After gathering the ESG data every year – 
that lacks fully accepted reporting standards worldwide – the analysts transform it into consistent 
units to enable quantitative analysis of this qualitative data. Indicatively, we note that: a) for 
environmental  factors  the  data  would  typically  include  information  on  energy  used,  water 
recycled, carbon emissions, waste recycled, and spills and pollution controversies and b) for 
social factors the data would typically include employee turnover, injury rate, accidents, training 
hours, women employees, donations, and health & safety controversies.  
The data points that are collected are categorized as “drivers” or “outcomes”. Drivers 
“track policies that cover issues such as emission reduction, human rights, and shareholder rights” 14 
 
whereas  outcomes  “track  quantitative  results  such  as  greenhouse  gas  emissions,  personnel 
turnover  and  highest  remuneration  package”.  Based  on  these  data  points,  Thomson  Reuters 
(ASSET4)  offers  a  comprehensive  platform  for  establishing  customizable  benchmarks  (e.g. 
sector, country etc) for the assessment of corporate performance. Annually, these 900 data points 
are used as  inputs  to  a default equal-weighted framework to  calculate 250 key performance 
indicators (KPIs), to be further organized into 18 categories within four pillars: a) environmental 
performance score, b) social performance score c) corporate governance score and d) economic 
performance score
5. In year t, a firm receives a z-score for each of the pillars, benchmarking its 
performance against the rest of the firms based on all the information available in fiscal t-1; 
therefore, by construction, our independent variable is lagged by one year. So, our final sample is 
an unbalanced panel dataset where the unit of observation is the firm-year dyad and where every 
firm receives a score on each of these pillars in every year. 
  For  our  analysis,  we  use  the  annual  environmental,  social  and  corporate  governance 
scores to construct a composite CSR index for every year and each focal firm. In the absence of 
theoretical guidance about how to weight each measure in constructing an aggregated CSR score, 
we follow the convention established by Waddock and Graves (1997) and Sharfman (1996), 
followed by Hillman and Keim (2001) and Waldman, Siegel and Javidan (2006) among others, 
in constructing a composite CSR index by assigning equal importance (and thus, equal weights) 
to each of the three pillars.
6 In particular, the variable CSR Index is the equally weighted average 
of the social, the environmental and the governance score for the focal firm for every year in our 
panel dataset.  
                                                            
5 An online appendix with a detailed description of the Thomson Reuters ASSET4 dataset is available online from 
the authors at: http://ioannou.us/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/OnlineApp.docx  
6 We note that the papers cited here used the KLD database instead, but the concept of assigning equal weights to 
the various aspects of corporate social responsibility, is the same. 15 
 
  We use two additional variables to test for the two theoretical mechanisms of how CSR 
impacts capital constraints. First, in order to capture Stakeholder Engagement we use a score 
directly from the ASSET4 dataset that measures the degree to which a focal company explains 
the formal processes in place for engagement with its stakeholders. Second, we measure ESG 
disclosure by identifying  in  our dataset  all the metrics (i.e. data points) for which the focal 
company failed to provide information. Therefore, the variable CSR Disclosure is equal to the 
average of indicator variables that measure whether a company has disclosed an information 
item or not in any given year, and as a result it ranges from zero to one.  
RESULTS 
Summary statistics 
Table  1  provides  descriptive  statistics  for  the  entire  sample.  Panel  A  presents  descriptive 
statistics for the multiple measures we use to capture the extent to which a focal firm is capital 
constrained, starting with the KZ index, but also the SA index, the WW index, the No Repurchase 
Indicator an as well as for the independent variables of interest. The sample includes firm-year 
pairs from a total of 49 countries across the world and a large number of unique firms: 486 firms 
in 2002, 495 firms in 2003, 1,049 firms in 2004, 1,376 firms in 2005, 1,400 firms in 2006, 1,537 
firms in 2007, 1,544 firms in 2008 and 2,191 firms in 2009.  Panel B presents the distribution of 
observations  across  sectors.  Three  sectors  –  light  and  heavy  manufacturing  (2,  3)  and 
transportation, communications, electric, gas and sanitary services (4) – represent a large portion 
of the total number of observations, although the remaining sectors are also populated. Panel C 
presents  the  distribution  of  observations  across  years  and  panel  D  across  countries. 
Approximately  50  percent  of  the  sample  originates  from  Japan,  the  USA  and  the  UK. 
Approximately 500 observations  are firms  from  East  and Southeast  Asian countries  such  as 16 
 
China, Indonesia, Thailand, India, Hong Kong and Singapore, and about 100 observations are 
firms  from  Latin  America.  Most  of  the  remaining  observations  are  firms  from  Continental 
European countries.  
The mean value of the KZ index is 0.07 and the standard deviation is 1.46 suggesting that 
significant variation exists across firms regarding the idiosyncratic capital constraints they face. 
About half of the firms in our sample have repurchased their own stock (mean of No Repurchase 
indicator is 0.48) during the period of the study. The mean value of the SA index is -1.17 and the 
standard deviation is 0.92 implying significant variation for this index as well.  The table also 
suggests that relatively less variation exists for the WW index. The average CSR Index in the 
sample is 0.52 and firms seem to perform slightly better on the Environmental and the Social, 
compared to the Corporate Governance dimension. The average Stakeholder Engagement in our 
sample varies significantly since the mean score is 46.12 and the standard deviation is 27.35. The 
mean CSR Disclosure score is 0.47. We present univariate correlations for all the variables of 
interest in part II of the appendix. 
Baseline models 
Panel A of Table 2 presents our baseline linear specifications that examine the relation between 
capital constraints and CSR performance. In column (1), the coefficient on CSR Index is negative 
and highly significant (-1.034, p-value<0.01), suggesting that on average firms with better CSR 
performance face lower capital  constraints. Since  larger firms  have better CSR performance 
(Ioannou and Serafeim, 2010b) and lower capital constraints (Hadlock and Pierce, 2010), the 
model controls for firm size as well country, industry, and year fixed effects. We measure firm 
size as the natural logarithm of total assets.
7 The estimated relation suggests that firms that score 
                                                            
7 We have alternatively used the natural logarithm of sales or ma rket capitalization with no meaningful impact on 
our findings. 17 
 
on the 75
th percentile of the CSR Index have a KZ Index that is lower by 0.40 compared to firms 
that score on the 25
th percentile of the CSR Index. This estimate is economically significant as it 
is equal to approximately 28% of the standard deviation of the KZ index. In column (2), we use a 
No Repurchase Indicator variable for the absence of stock repurchases as an alternative, albeit 
less coarse proxy for idiosyncratic firm capital constraints. We follow Hong et al., (2011) in 
calculating  this  indicator  by  deducting  preferred  stock  reduction  from  expenditure  on  the 
purchase of common and preferred stocks.  Again, the coefficient on CSR Index is negative and 
significant (-0.401, p-value<0.01). In column (3), we use an equal-weighted KZ Index to test 
whether our results are sensitive to the empirically derived weights assigned to each of its five 
components in past literature. Specifically, in constructing the equal-weighted KZ Index, all five 
ratios are first standardized to have a normal distribution with a mean of zero and a standard 
deviation of one, therefore eliminate differences in scale across them. The equal-weighted KZ 
Index  exhibits  a  high  positive  correlation  with  the  weighted  KZ  Index  (0.77,  p-value<0.01), 
suggesting that the measure of capital constraints is only moderately affected by changing the 
weights on each component.  The results in column (3) are consistent with the results in columns 
(1) and (2). and confirm that firms with better CSR performance have lower capital constraints (-
0.204, p-value<0.01). 
In columns  (4)  and (5) we  use alternative measures  of capital constraints  to  provide 
further validity to our findings and address recent criticisms of the KZ Index. In particular, we 
follow Hadlock and Pierce (2010) in constructing the SA Index, and Whitted and Wu (2006) in 
constructing the WW Index (see part II of the appendix). Columns (4) and (5) do not include Size 
as a control since size is used in the derivation of the dependent variable. The results suggest that 
the main findings are robust to these alternative measures of capital constraints; the coefficient 18 
 
on the CSR Index obtains a negative sign and it is highly significant (p-value<0.01) across all 
specifications. 
In Panel B of Table 2, we introduce firm fixed effects for all the specifications of Panel A 
to  mitigate  concerns  that  the  results  are  driven  by  an  unidentified  time-invariant  firm 
characteristic that is correlated with both the CSR index and proxies for capital constraints. For 
these specifications the coefficient of interest is estimated through changes over time within a 
focal firm. Moreover, for a particular firm to be included in this analysis, we require that we have 
complete data for all eight years (i.e. we generate a balanced panel of observations).
8 We impose 
this criterion to ensure that there is enough variation in both dependent and independent variables 
within  a  firm.     Consistent  with  columns  (1)   to  (5),  we  find  that  firms  with  better  CSR 
performance face lower capital constraints as measured by the KZ Index (-0.457, p-value<0.05).
9 
The estimated relation suggests that firms that score on the 75
th percentile of the CSR Index have 
a KZ index that is lower by 0.18 compared to firms that score on the 25
th percentile of the CSR 
Index, with this estimate being approximately 12% of the standard deviation of the KZ Index, for 
this subsample. Moreover, our results are confirmed when using the equal-weighted KZ Index 
and the  WW  Index as  alternative measures  of performance;  the coefficient  on  CSR Index  is 
negative and highly significant at -0.183 (p-value<0.01) and -0.017 (p-value<0.01), respectively. 
The findings are also confirmed when we use the No Repurchase Indicator, and the SA Index but 
the estimated coefficient is not significant. We note however, that in the case of the SA Index, 
introducing  firm  fixed  effects  substantially  reduces  the  power  of  our  test  given  the  high 
autocorrelation of the SA index; indicatively, the adjusted R-squared is 96.6%. 
                                                            
8 We obtain similar results when we include all firms in our sample. 
9 Because the KZ index was developed and tested primarily within the US setting, we also performed our analysis 
only with US data. The results were very similar when we restricted the sample only to US firms. 19 
 
In unreported results, we estimated the specifications of Panel A Table 2 by including 
controls for lagged dependent variables three years prior to the focal year of measurement of the 
dependent  variable.  The  use  of  the  lagged  dependent  variable  effectively  controls  for  all 
historical factors that may have influenced the firm’s capital constraints in the past. Our findings 
remain robust to these specifications as well. The coefficient on CSR index was negative and 
significant in all five specifications. 
Relation between CSR and capital constraints for different levels of capital constraints 
One potential concern with the findings presented so far is reverse causality and as a result, 
possible endogeneity of our CSR variable. Specifically, firms that are less capital constrained 
might invest in more CSR initiatives and achieve better CSR performance (Hong et al., 2011). 
This argument would suggest that engagement with CSR initiatives is a form of a “luxury good” 
that firms can afford only when they face no or very low capital constraints. If this is the case 
then CSR is correlated with the error term and the coefficient on the CSR Index is biased and 
inconsistent. In table 3 we perform subsample analyses to empirically investigate this issue. If 
the  luxury  good  argument  holds,  one  would  expect  the  relation  between  CSR  and  capital 
constraints to be stronger for firms facing the lowest capital constraints. This is because for such 
firms a higher proportion of an additional dollar of financing will be deployed to CSR strategies 
compared  to  a  firm  that  faces  high  capital  constraints  and  which  is  likely  to  deploy  that 
additional source of financing to other projects that are not luxury goods. We categorize the 
firms in our sample into three groups based on the level of capital constraints that they face (i.e. 
the KZ Index) compared to their sector peers’ located in the same country and year, and run the 
same baseline model as in Table 2 (column 1) interacting the CSR Index with indicator variables 
for each of the three groups; the Medium Constrained group constitutes the baseline category. 20 
 
The results in Table 3 show that contrary to what one would predict based on the luxury good 
argument, for the subgroup of firms that are least capital constrained, the coefficient of interest is 
positive and significant suggesting that for this group of firms the relation between CSR and 
capital constraints is the weakest. In contrast, for the most constrained firms the relation is the 
strongest. We conclude from this test that the results presented so far are unlikely to be driven 
primarily by reverse causality. 
ESG ratings as exogenous shock to CSR performance 
To test the robustness of our results to potentially yet unidentified endogeneity problems we 
follow Chatterji and Toffel (2010) in identifying a shock to the CSR performance of a company. 
More specifically, Chatterji and Toffel (2010) argue and empirically confirm that when a rating 
agency starts rating a firm (that it had not previously rated), it will generate a response from the 
firm. According to their hypothesis 1: “Firms that will receive a poor environmental rating will 
subsequently  improve  their  environmental  performance  more  than  other  firms  will.”  This 
improvement in environmental performance, and in our case CSR performance more generally, 
is driven by the initiation of the rating process and it is a reaction by the company to protect its 
reputation.  Therefore,  the  subsequent  improvement  in  CSR  performance  is  not  caused  by  a 
decrease in capital constraints.  
We design and implement the follow test: within the pool of companies that ASSET4 
initiates coverage and within each industry-country pair, we select the company with the lowest 
CSR rating and we match it with another company - that ASSET4 initiated coverage on the same 
year and belongs in the same industry-country pair - that has the closest KZ Index. Essentially 
with this process we are matching firms on the coverage initiation decision, country, industry and 
initial capital constraints. Then, we track the KZ Index and CSR performance of these (paired) 21 
 
firms over the next three years.  We construct the next pair of firms by selecting the firm with the 
second lowest CSR rating and so on until there is no more firms that we can match within the 
same industry-country pair that ASSET4 initiates coverage. Consistent with Chatterji and Toffel 
(2010), we find that firms with originally poor CSR ratings do exhibit an improvement in their 
subsequent ratings more so than their better rated counterparts. Importantly,  and in accordance 
with  our  argument  stating  that  improvements  in  CSR  ratings  drive  a  decrease  in  capital 
constraints,  we  find  that,  on  average,  firms  with  poor  CSR  ratings  decrease  their  capital 
constraints more than their better rated (paired) firms, as they improve their CSR ratings. The 
results of this analysis are presented in Table 4: both the change in CSR and the KZ Index for the 
two groups are shown  as  well as  the statistical  significance of the differences-in-differences 
estimates. 
Instrumental variables and simultaneous equations models 
We complement the above analysis with two additional approaches: a) an instrumental variables 
and  b)  a  simultaneous  regressions  approach.  The  advantage  of  the  instrumental  variables 
approach is that the estimated coefficients are more likely to be consistent (Wooldridge, 2002). 
However, the estimates from an instrumental variables approach are less efficient because the 
standard errors are large (Wooldridge, 2002). The advantage of the simultaneous regressions 
model is that it is a more efficient estimation procedure because it uses the errors from two or 
more equations. But the estimates are less likely to be consistent because the instruments used in 
both  equations  need  to  be  exogenous,  compared  to  the  instrumental  variables  approach  that 
requires exogenous instruments only for the endogenous variable (Wooldridge, 2002). We note 
that an additional issue with our data is the presence of heteroskedasticity, which we detected 
through  a  test  proposed  by  Pagan  and  Hall  (1983)  for  panel  data.  In  the  presence  of 22 
 
heteroskedasticity  or  clustered  errors,  although  the  standard  IV  coefficient  estimates  remain 
consistent,  their  standard  errors  and  the  usual  forms  of  the  diagnostic  tests  are  not  (Baum, 
Schaffer  and  Stillman,  2003).  To  address  this  issue,  we  specify  a  GMM  option  in  our 
implementation to make efficient estimation, valid inference and diagnostic testing, allowing for 
clustering the errors at the firm level. 
  We  generate  two  instruments  by  calculating  the  average  CSR  Index  (excluding  the 
contribution of the focal firm) for each country-sector pair and country-year pair.
10 The rationale 
behind these  two instruments is that the firm ’s  CSR  performance  is  influenced  by  a  time-
invariant component that is associated with its membership in the country-industry pair, and a 
time-varying  component  at  the  country  level.  The  intuition  is  that  a  focal  firm’s  CSR 
performance is systematically influenced by the CSR performance of other firms within the same 
industry-country pair, and by the CSR performance of other firms in the same country over time. 
In fact, previous research has shown that CSR performance is determined by both country and 
industry  characteristics  (Ioannou  and  Serafeim,  2012).  Moreover,  CSR  performance  might 
systematically vary over time within countries as a result of laws and regulations that mandate 
CSR disclosure (Ioannou and Serafeim, 2011). Because for both instruments the contribution to 
the CSR Index by the focal firm is excluded, the instruments vary across firms even within the 
same  country-industry  and  country-year  pairs.  More  importantly,  since  we  are  using  two 
instruments we are able to perform a number of tests to assess their validity and their relevance.  
  Columns (1) and (2) of Table 5 present the results from the first and second stage of the 
instrumental variables regression, respectively. We report results for three post-estimation tests. 
First, the under-identification test is essentially an LM test of whether our equation is identified. 
                                                            
10 Previous papers have also used as instruments the industry or country mean of the independent variable (Lev and 
Sougiannis, 1996; Nevo, 2000; Friedberg, 2003; Hanlon, Rajgopal, and Shevlin, 2003). 23 
 
In the presence of heteroskedaticity, the more traditional Anderson LM and Cragg-Donald Wald 
statistics  are  no  longer  valid.  Instead,  table  5  presents  the  LM  and  Wald  versions  of  the 
Kleibergen-Paap (2006) rk statistic, which is a generalization of the more traditional tests. For 
our data, the model is always  identified. Second, the weak identification test estimates  how 
relevant and how strong our instruments are. In the presence of heteroskedasticity, the traditional 
Cragg-Donald-based  F-statistic  is  not  valid  so  instead,  we  report  again  the  Kleibergen-Paap 
Walk rk F-statistic. For our sample, the F-statistic is at least 20, warranting that our instruments 
are relevant and strong. Finally, we report on the over-identification test. For this test, the null 
hypothesis is that the instruments are exogenous (uncorrelated with the error term), so if the 
statistic is significant and the p-value is small enough, this suggests that the instruments are not 
exogenous. Since the traditional Sagan test is no longer valid, we report in table 5 a Hansen’s J 
statistic (1982), which remains consistent when the error is heteroskedastic. For our specification, 
the test statistics are insignificant and the p-value is very high. Therefore the null hypothesis is 
not rejected.  
These tests show that the instruments satisfy the conditions of exogeneity and relevance 
and as a result they are valid. The coefficient on the CSR Index is negative and significant (-
2.348,  p-value<0.01),  suggesting  that  the  exogenous  component  of  the  CSR  performance 
negatively impacts capital constraints. As a robustness check, we run the same specification on a 
balanced panel which allowed us to include firm fixed effects in our specifications. Despite the 
reduction of observations to 2,616 in unreported results the coefficient on CSR Index remains 
negative and highly significant. We also note that in the construction of our instruments, some 
bias may have been introduced by the fact that some country-sector or country-year pairs were 
not sufficiently populated to generate a meaningful instrument. In unreported results, we drop 24 
 
those observations for which the instruments were generated in a country-sector or country-year 
cell with fewer than 10 observations. Our results remain virtually unchanged.   
In order to eliminate any remaining endogeneity problem resulting from simultaneity bias 
(i.e. if the causal effects obtain in both directions), we endogenize both the CSR Index as well as 
the  KZ  Index  by  implementing  a  simultaneous  equations  estimation  method  (one  for  each 
plausible causal direction). In doing so, we use the constructed instruments as explained above 
for the CSR Index, and by constructing similar instruments for the KZ Index (i.e. the average KZ 
Index for each country-sector pair and country-year pair). More specifically, we use a three-stage 
least squares (3SLS) estimation method where we first use an instrumental variables approach to 
produce consistent estimates and subsequently use generalized least squares (GLS) to account for 
correlated  error  terms  across  our  two  equations  (Wooldridge,  2002).
11 For  this  system  of 
simultaneous equations to be identified, there must be at least as many non -collinear exogenous 
variables in the remaining system as ther e are endogenous right -hand-side variables in an 
equation (Wooldridge, 2002). This condition is satisfied in our system of equations, where there 
is only one right-hand-side endogenous variable in each equation, and two exogenous variables 
in the remaining system. 
Columns (3) and (4) of  Table 5 show that implementing this simultaneous equations 
methodology produces similar results as our baseline specifications.
12 The coefficient on the CSR 
Index is negative and significant (-1.545, p-value<0.01). The coefficient on the KZ Index is also 
negative  and  significant  (-0.048,  p-value=0.01).  These  results  suggest  that  superior  CSR 
performance leads to lower capital constraints but also that lower capital constraints lead to an 
                                                            
11 To be more specific, we implement this technique using the reg3 command in the statistical package STATA. 
12 In unreported results, we utilized a transformed (logarithmic) version of  the KZ Index to account for the fact that 
CSR performance could potentially be more important for the firms that are least capital constrained (i.e. a non -
linear relation). Our findings were robust to this specification as well, and therefore we do not report them here.  25 
 
improvement  in  CSR  performance.  However,  closer  inspection  of  the  estimated  coefficients 
reveals that CSR performance has a much higher economic effect compared to capital constraints. 
Firms that score on the 75
th percentile of the CSR Index have a KZ Index that is lower by 0.60 
compared to firms that score on the 25
th percentile of the CSR Index, an estimate that is equal to 
41% of the standard deviation of the KZ index. In contrast, firms that score on the 75
th percentile 
of the KZ Index have a CSR Index that is lower by 0.059 compared to firms that score on the 25
th 
percentile of the KZ Index, an estimate that is equal to 24% of the standard deviation of the CSR 
Index. 
CSR disclosure and stakeholder engagement 
In  table  6  we  explore  at  a  more  fine-grained  level  the  mechanisms  through  which  CSR 
performance impacts capital constraints. In particular, we provide evidence that both Stakeholder 
Engagement and CSR Disclosure have a significant impact. Since firms with better stakeholder 
engagement also tend to have better CSR disclosure, we include the two variables individually 
and  simultaneously  in  our  model.  Column  (1)  shows  the  estimated  association  between 
Stakeholder  Engagement  and  the  KZ  index.  The  coefficient  on  Stakeholder  Engagement  is 
negative and significant (-0.005, p-value<0.01); firms with better stakeholder engagement face 
lower capital constraints. Column (2) shows that the estimated coefficient on CSR Disclosure is 
also negative and significant (-4.264, p-value<0.01); firms with better CSR disclosure face lower 
capital constraints. Column (3) shows the estimated coefficients on Stakeholder Engagement and 
CSR Disclosure when both variables are included simultaneously. Both coefficients are negative 
and  significant,  suggesting  that  even  when  we  hold  stakeholder  engagement  constant,  CSR 
disclosure  has  a  significant  association  with  capital  constraints.  Similarly,  holding  CSR 
disclosure constant, stakeholder engagement has a significant association with capital constraints. 26 
 
A change of one standard deviation in stakeholder engagement (disclosure) is associated with a 
change in the KZ index of 0.10 (0.35) suggesting that disclosure has a larger effect on capital 
constraints. Column (4) shows coefficient estimates when we control for the quality of financial 
disclosures. We include this control to mitigate concerns that the CSR Disclosure variable is 
capturing the effect of financial disclosures on capital constraints. We use an earnings quality 
measure constructed by McNichols (2002), who estimate total current accruals as a function of 
lag, current, and previous cash flow from operations, changes in revenues, and gross value of 
property plant and equipment separately for each industry-year pair. We find that, as expected, 
better earnings quality (lower volatility of accounting accruals) is associated with lower capital 
constraints. Importantly, the coefficient on CSR Disclosure remains negative and significant. 
Relation between CSR pillars and capital constraints 
Finally, we note that  CSR comprises  of  three pillars: the environmental,  the  social,  and  the 
governance  performance  of  a  corporation.  To  better  understand  the  distinct  impact  of  these 
pillars on capital constraints, we estimate separate models for each one. Table 8, columns (1), (2), 
and (3) show that the coefficients on environmental (-0.770, p-value<0.01), social (-0.727, p-
value<0.01)  and  governance  (-0.397,  p-value<0.01)  performance  are  negative  and  highly 
significant. In column (4) we consider the effect of all three pillars simultaneously and we find 
that  both  social  and  environmental  performances  are  negatively  and  significantly  related  to 
capital constraints. In contrast, corporate governance exhibits an insignificant relation to capital 
constraints after we control for the social and environmental performance of a corporation. An 
explanation  for  the  weaker  effect  of  corporate  governance  is  that  corporate  governance  is 
primarily driven by variation in nation-level institutional structures and as a result it is likely that 
the relation between corporate governance and capital constraints is stronger across countries 27 
 
rather than within a country. Indeed, when we remove country fixed effects from the model, the 
coefficient on corporate governance becomes negative and significant across all specifications. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we investigate whether CSR strategies affect the firm’s ability to access 
finance  in  capital  markets.  Although  it  has  been  argued  in  the  past  that  CSR  may  impose 
unnecessary costs to a firm (e.g. Galaskiewicz, 1997; Clotfelter, 1985:190; Navarro, 1988) and 
thus hinder its ability to access capital, here we provide evidence that in fact the reverse is true: 
firms with better CSR performance face lower capital constraints. We argue that this negative 
relation  between  CSR  performance  and  capital  constraints  materializes  via  two  distinct 
mechanisms. First, better CSR performance is associated with superior stakeholder engagement 
(Choi and Wang, 2009) that in turn significantly reduces the likelihood of opportunistic behavior 
and introduces a more efficient form of contracting with key constituents (Jones, 1995). In other 
words, stakeholder engagement based on mutual trust and cooperation reduces potential agency 
costs by pushing managers to adopt a long-term rather than a short-term orientation (Eccles, et 
al., 2012). Moreover, superior stakeholder engagement enhances the revenue or profit generating 
potential of the firm through the higher quality of relationships with customers, business partners 
and among employees. Secondly, firms with better CSR performance are more likely to publicly 
disclose their CSR activities (Dhaliwal et al., 2011) and consequently become more transparent 
and accountable. Higher levels of transparency reduce informational asymmetries between the 
firm and investors, thus mitigating perceived risk. Since the literature to date has argued that 
market frictions such as informational asymmetries and agency costs are the main reasons why 
firms face upward sloping supply curves in the capital markets, our results show that firms with 
better CSR performance face a capital supply curve that is effectively less steep.  28 
 
  These results have implications for the current debate on whether, and importantly in 
what ways, CSR initiatives lead to value creation.  Here, we document that firms with better 
CSR  performance  are  better  positioned  to  obtain  financing  in  the  capital  markets.  In  turn, 
relaxation of capital constrains positively impacts the ability of firms to undertake profitable 
strategic investments that otherwise they would not, and stock market performance (e.g., Lamont 
et al., 2001).  
  With this study we contribute to an emerging literature within CSR that highlights the 
important role that capital markets play in evaluating the potential for long-run value creation by 
firms that adopt CSR strategies (e.g. Lee and Faff, 2009; El Ghoul et al., 2010; Goss and Roberts, 
2011). Allocating scarce financial capital to their most productive uses is the fundamental role 
that financial markets play and in this paper we show that CSR has a significant impact on this 
capital  allocation  process:    market  participants  are  more  willing  to  allocate  scarce  capital 
resources  to  firms  with  better  CSR  performance.  Moreover,  by  disaggregating  the  CSR 
performance into its components, we are able to show at a more fine-grained level that both the 
social and the environmental aspect of CSR activities reduce capital constraints. 
  With our work we also contribute to the extant literature on capital constraints. Prior 
studies in this area typically consider a portfolio of financially constrained versus a portfolio of 
financially  unconstrained  firms  and  investigate  how  the  two  portfolios  exhibit  different 
sensitivities of investment to either cash flow (Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen, 1988; Kaplan and 
Zingales, 1997; Hubbard, 1998; Cleary, 1999; Alti, 2003; Gatchev, Pulvino and Tarhan 2010) or 
to non-fundamental movements in stock prices (Baker, Stein and Wurgler, 2003). However, few 
studies (e.g. Lamont et al., 2001) have investigated which firms are more likely to be financially 
unconstrained  and  what  characteristics,  if  any,  the  firms  in  each  portfolio  share.  Our  paper 29 
 
contributes to this literature by showing that firms that engage in CSR activities face lower 
capital constraints, thus identifying tangible firm characteristics that are linked to the capital 
constraints a firm faces. 
  We recognize a number of limitations to our work. Firms could be in a position to game 
CSR ratings so as to gain access to the increasingly available SRI funds.  This is surely plausible 
but unlikely due to a number of reasons. First, company-reported data is all but one of the many 
sources that are being used by Thompson Reuters ASSET4 to gather information. The list of 
sources would also include NGOs (and NGO websites), stock exchange filings, and independent 
news sources. As much as the company could ‘game’ their own reporting, it is unlikely that it 
would be able to influence to the same degree all of these third-party sources. Therefore, there is 
a  significant  degree  of  triangulation  that  occurs  across  numerous  information  originators.  
  Second, the Thompson Reuters ASSET4 data have been used extensively for investment 
purposes by professionals and thus have been ‘verified’, to an extent, by the capital markets. In 
fact, it is estimated that investors representing more than €2.5trillion assets under management 
use the ASSET4 data, including major investment houses. Furthermore, according to Thomson 
Reuters, “every answer to every data point question goes through a multi-step verification and 
process  control,  which  includes  a  series  of  data  entry  checks,  automated  quality  rules  and 
historical comparisons, in order to ensure a high level of accuracy, timeliness and quality”. This 
later issue also relates to a second potential limitation of this study: the quality of our data. 
Whereas a comprehensive validity test of this new dataset falls outside the scope of this paper, 
this is surely one possible avenue through which  our work could be extended in the future. 
Especially when compared to existing studies and datasets, and accounting for our own extensive 
conversations with Thompson Reuters, we maintain a sufficient amount of confidence in the data.30 
 
  Another potential issue with our work relates to the emergence of the SRI market and 
how such funds may influence the capital markets and CSR ratings. First we note that despite the 
impressive  growth  of  SRI  funds  in  recent  years,  when  compared  to  total  assets  under 
management globally, the level of SRI funds is still relatively small. As an additional robustness 
check, we constructed a country-level indicator variable capturing the existence (or lack thereof) 
of an SRI stock index in every country of our sample. We used this control variable as a proxy 
for  the  availability  of  SRI  funds,  and  across  all  specifications,  the  coefficient  remained 
insignificant. As SRI funds grow over time and in importance, future work adopting a more 
dynamic approach could seek to understand their potential impact on both the functioning of 
capital markets as well as the construction of CSR ratings. 
  Moreover, with regards to a potential link between SRIs and our independent variable, 
the CSR Index, we argue that although plausible, it is unlikely that investor behavior may be 
driving managerial decision-making. Since stakeholder relations and CSR actions more broadly 
take several years to build, and materialize in terms of profitability, the probability of a large 
enough SRI base retaining ownership for a sufficiently long amount of time to originate an 
organizational  shift  towards  CSR  strategies  is  relatively  low.  This  would  also  require  SRIs 
themselves to engage with the company over a long period of time in such a way as to actively 
push the corporation towards better CSR practices. In other words, it appears more likely that 
SRI funds will be attracted to organizations that score high on the CSR dimensions rather than 
SRI  funds  directly  influencing  firm  practices,  directing  them  towards  being  more  socially 
responsible. 
  While  we  show  that  superior  CSR  performance  may  relax  idiosyncratic  capital 
constraints for firms, several issues remain open for future research. First, using data at the level 31 
 
of strategic projects, it would be interesting to explore whether, and in what ways, increased 
access to capital affects the type of strategic investments that firms decide to undertake. For 
example, do firms with better CSR performance pursue strategic projects that are more long-term 
oriented  and  more  likely  to  incorporate  environmental  and  social  issues  in  their  objectives? 
Second, whereas capital constraints is one important aspect of capital markets, more research 
needs to be undertaken in this domain for a better understanding of how capital markets perceive, 
evaluate and reward or punish firms that voluntarily engage in CSR initiatives. Moreover, since 
we do find some evidence that capital constraints may in fact affect CSR performance, future 
research could adopt a more dynamic approach, and investigate over a longer time frame how the 
causal relationship evolves in the long-run, particularly so for firms that are most constrained 
with low CSR performance, after they decide to undertake such investments in CSR initiatives. 
  Finally, in a business environment where an increasing number of CEOs consider CSR to 
be strategically critical, and where the general public increasingly appreciates or even demands 
transparent,  honest  and  ethical  business  practices,  our  results  have  important  managerial 
implications. We suggest that managers that are able to develop successful CSR strategies and, 
by extension, engage productively with key stakeholders can generate tangible benefits for their 
firms in the form of better access to financing.  
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics  
 
Panel A: Summary Statistics 
 
Variable  N  Mean  Median  Std. 
Dev.  Min.  25th 
Perc. 
75th 
Perc.  Max. 
KZ index  10078  0.07  0.32  1.46  -8.08  -0.35  0.87  4.39 
No Repurchase Indicator  10078  0.48  0.00  0.50  0.00  0.00  1.00  1.00 
SA Index  9952  -1.17  -1.10  0.92  -3.85  -1.79  -0.54  3.10 
WW Index  9819  -0.43  -0.43  0.07  -0.67  -0.47  -0.38  -0.11 
CSR Index  10078  0.52  0.52  0.24  0.05  0.33  0.72  0.98 
Stakeholder Engagement  9812  46.12  34.29  27.3
5  28.06  28.08  36.09  99.75 
 CSR Disclosure   9812  0.47  0.48  0.09  0.12  0.42  0.52  0.73 
Environmental  10078  0.54  0.56  0.32  0.09  0.19  0.87  0.97 
Social  10078  0.53  0.54  0.31  0.00  0.23  0.83  0.99 
Corporate Governance  10078  0.49  0.53  0.31  0.01  0.18  0.77  0.99 
Size   10078  8.59  8.50  1.40  2.01  7.63  9.53  12.81 
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Panel B: Sample Distribution across Sectors 
 
SIC 
Code
13  Industry Categories  N 
1  Mining and Construction  1,221 
2 
Manufacturing of Food, Textile, 
Lumber, Publishing, Chemicals and 
Petroleum Products 
2,019 
3 
Manufacturing of Plastics, Leather, 
Concrete, Metal Products, 
Machinery and Equipment 
2,814 
4  Transportation, Communications, 
Electric, Gas and Sanitary Services  1,743 
5  Trade  1,080 
7  Personal, Business and  
Entertainment Services  924 
8  Professional Services  275 
9  Public Administration  2 
  Total  10,078 
 
 
Panel C: Sample Distribution across Years 
 
Year  N 
2002  486 
2003  495 
2004  1,049 
2005  1,376 
2006  1,400 
2007  1,537 
2008  1,544 
2009  2,191 
Total  10,078 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
13 For a detailed list of SIC codes and what they 
represent, please see 
http://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/sic_manual.html. 
Panel D: Sample Distribution across Countries 
 
Country  N  Country  N 
Australia  409  Italy  169 
Austria  77  Japan  1,874 
Belgium  84  Korea, Republic of  62 
Bermuda  13  Kuwait  1 
Brazil  46  Luxembourg  36 
Canada  426  Morocco  2 
Switzerland  285  Mexico  32 
Chile  15  Malaysia  17 
China  70  Netherlands  175 
Cayman 
Islands  2  Norway  107 
Czech 
Republic  4  New Zealand  49 
Germany  361  Philippines  4 
Denmark  123  Poland  8 
Egypt  2  Portugal  45 
Spain  150  Qatar  2 
Finland  145  Russian Federation  42 
France  448  Saudi Arabia  11 
United 
Kingdom  1,388  Singapore  136 
Greece  65  Sweden  230 
Hong Kong  225  Thailand  11 
Hungary  3  Turkey  10 
Indonesia  10  Taiwan  36 
India  38  United States  2,517 
Ireland  74  South Africa  21 
Israel  18     
Total  10,078 
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Table 2  
 
Capital Constraints and CSR Performance: Linear Baseline Specifications 
 
   Panel A  Panel B 
Dependent 
Variable 
KZ Index 
No 
Repurchase 
Indicator 
KZ Index 
Equal-
weighted 
SA Index  WW Index  KZ Index 
No 
Repurchase 
Indicator 
KZ Index 
Equal-
weighted 
SA Index  WW Index 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
                                
CSR Index  -1.034***  -0.401***  -0.204***  -2.025***  -0.155***  -0.457**  -0.587  -0.183***  -0.084  -0.017*** 
   (0.120)  (0.109)  (0.035)  (0.065)  (0.005)  (0.204)  (0.368)  (0.059)  (0.061)  (0.006) 
                                
Size   0.222***  -0.079***  0.067***        0.124  0.247  -0.011       
   (0.027)  (0.021)  (0.008)        (0.110)  (0.175)  (0.034)       
                                
Constant  -0.973***  0.445  -0.244  -0.354*  -0.265  -0.921  -1.631  0.344  -2.658***  -0.296*** 
   (0.166)  (0.770)  (0.187)  (0.197)  (0.000)  (1.313)  (1.562)  (0.409)  (0.066)  (0.002) 
                                
Country FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  No  No  No  No 
Industry FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  No  No  No  No 
Year FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Firm FE  No  No  No  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  10,078  10,017  10,078  9,952  9,819  2,616  1,928  2,616  2,576  2,560 
Adjusted R-
squared 
0.213  (Pseudo) 
0.142 
0.175  0.5  0.467  0.612  (Pseudo) 
0.290 
0.609  0.966  0.93 
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10, based on two-tailed tests, robust standard errors, clustered at the firm level in parentheses. (1): OLS regression with full 
sample, (2): Probit Regression with full sample, (3), (4), (5): OLS regression with full sample. (6): OLS regression with balanced sample, (7): Probit 
Regression with balanced sample, (8), (9), (10): OLS regression with balanced sample. 
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Table 3: Capital Constraints and CSR Performance:  
Sub-Groups analysis 
 
Dependent Variable  KZ index 
CSR Index  -0.417*** 
   (0.090) 
     
CSR Index   0.372** 
* Least Constraint Dummy  (0.166) 
     
CSR Index   -0.413*** 
* Most Constraint Dummy  (0.106) 
     
Size (log of total assets)  0.126*** 
 
(0.019) 
Constant  -0.017 
   (0.808) 
Constant   -1.390*** 
* Least Constraint Dummy  (0.103) 
Constant   1.050*** 
* Most Constraint Dummy  (0.066) 
     
Country FE  Yes 
Industry FE  Yes 
Year FE  Yes 
Observations  10,078 
R-squared  0.534 
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10, based on two-tailed tests, robust standard 
errors, clustered at the firm level in parentheses.  
Table 4: Capital Constraints and CSR Performance: Rating as a 
shock to CSR performance  
  
  
Periods  N  ΔKZ for 
High CSR 
ΔKZ for 
Low CSR 
Diffs-in-
diffs  p-value 
ΔCSR 
Index 
t, t+1  210  -0.01  0.10  0.11  0.041 
t, t+2  200  0.03  0.16  0.13  0.043 
t, t+3  186  0.05  0.19  0.14  0.040 
ΔKZ 
t, t+1  210  0.15  -0.12  -0.27  0.020 
t, t+2  200  -0.05  -0.27  -0.22  0.023 
t, t+3  186  0.06  -0.29  -0.35  0.011 
 
Periods are the years between which the change in the KZ index is calculated. N is the 
number  of  pairs  in  each  group.  High  CSR  includes  firms  that  ASSET  4  initiated 
coverage and they are matched to firms in the Low CSR group by industry, country 
and  KZ  index  at  time  t.  Low  CSR  group  includes  firms  that  ASSET4  initiated 
coverage and they have lower CSR performance compared to the High CSR group. 
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Table 5: Capital Constraints and CSR Performance: 
Instrumental Variables and Simultaneous Equations Specifications 
 
   Instrumental Variables  Simultaneous Equations 
   First Stage  KZ Index  KZ Index  CSR Index 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
CSR Index     -2.348***  -1.545***    
      (0.814)  (0.435)    
KZ Index           -0.048*** 
            (0.007) 
              
Country Year Mean of CSR  0.127**        0.122*** 
(1st Instrument for CSR)  (0.052)        (0.039) 
Country Sector Mean of CSR  0.512***        0.455*** 
(2nd Instrument for CSR)  (0.050)        (0.031) 
Country Year Mean of KZ        -0.113***    
(1st Instrument for KZ)        (0.043)    
Country Sector Mean of KZ        0.538***    
(2nd Instrument for KZ)        (0.035)    
              
Size   0.092***  0.346***  0.259***  0.098*** 
   (0.003)  (0.080)  (0.043)  (0.002) 
Constant        -1.170  -0.807*** 
         (1.840)  (0.225) 
Country fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  10,078  10,078  10,078  10,078 
(Centered) R-squared  0.313  0.001  0.232  0.477 
Kleibergen-Raap rk LM statistic 
 
63.957     
(Underidentification test)  (p=0.000)     
Kleibergen-Raap rk Wald F Statistic 
  54.947     
(Weak identification test)     
Hansen J statistic 
 
0.058     
(Overidentification test)  (p=0.789)     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10, based on two-tailed tests, robust standard errors, clustered at the firm level in 
parentheses. Note:  Columns (1) and (2): Regression using two-step feasible efficient GMM estimation, employing 
two variables (country-year mean of CSR and country-sector mean of CSR) as the instruments for the endogenous 
regressor CSR Index. The dependent variable is KZ Index. Thus, KZit = a0 + a1 CSRit where CSRit instrumented by 
CSR_CYit and CSR_CSit Columns (3) and (4): simultaneous regression using three-stage least-squares estimation, 
employing two variables (the country-year mean and the country-sector mean) for each endogenous regressor (CSR 
Index and KZ Index). Thus, Column (3): KZit = c0 + c1 CSRit + c2 KZ_CYit + c3 KZ_CSit  and Column (4) CSRit = d0 
+ d1 KZit + d2 CSR_CYit + d3 CSR_CSit 41 
 
Table 6: Capital Constraints and CSR Performance: Stakeholder Engagement and Disclosure 
Independent Variables  Engagement 
(1) 
Disclosure 
(2) 
Engagement and 
Disclosure 
Engagement and 
Disclosure 
(3)  (4) 
Stakeholder Engagement  -0.005*** 
(0.001) 
  -0.003*** 
(0.001) 
-0.002** 
(0.001) 
         
CSR Disclosure    -4.264***  -3.918***  -4.081*** 
    (0.432)  (0.455)  (0.467) 
 
Inverse Financial Accounting 
Quality 
 
       
3.723** 
(1.804) 
Size   0.164***  0.215***  0.229***  0.233*** 
  (0.026)  (0.026)  (0.027)  (0.028) 
         
Constant  -3.156***  -2.721***  -2.834***  -0.229 
  (0.330)  (0.334)  (0.335)  (0.249) 
Country fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  9,812  9,812  9,812  9,224 
R-squared  0.196  0.212  0.213  0.223 
(1), (2), (3) and (4): OLS regressions with full sample, where the dependent variable is the KZ index. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.10, based on two-tailed tests, robust standard errors, clustered at the firm level in parentheses.   
 
Table 7: Capital Constraints and CSR Performance: By Factors 
  KZ Index 
(1) 
KZ Index 
(2) 
KZ Index 
(3) 
KZ Index 
(4) 
Environmental  -0.770***      -0.495*** 
  (0.087)      (0.100) 
         
Social    -0.727***    -0.444*** 
    (0.084)    (0.097) 
         
Corporate Governance      -0.397***  0.060 
      (0.118)  (0.121) 
         
Size  0.211***  0.208***  0.146***  0.228*** 
  (0.026)  (0.027)  (0.026)  (0.027) 
         
Constant  0.323  0.576  0.749  0.371 
  (0.789)  (0.798)  (0.772)  (0.799) 
Country fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  10,078  10,078  10,078  10,078 
Adjusted R-squared  0.212  0.212  0.200  0.215 
(1), (2), (3) and (4): OLS regressions with full sample, where the dependent variable is the KZ index. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.10, based on two-tailed tests, robust standard errors, clustered at the firm level in parentheses.      42 
 
APPENDIX 
 
 
I.  Construction of the KZ, SA and WW Indices 
 
We calculate the KZ index following Baker, Stein and Wurgler (2003) as follows:  
KZ index = -1.002 CFit/Ait-1  -39.368 DIVit/Ait-1  - 1.315 Cit/Ait-1 + 3.139 LEVit + 0.283 Qit,  
where CFit/Ait-1 is cash flow over lagged assets; DIVit/Ait-1  is  cash dividends over lagged assets; 
Cit/Ait-1 is cash balances over assets; LEVit is leverage and Qit is the market value of equity (price 
times shares outstanding plus assets minus the book value of equity over assets. The original 
ordered logit regression and full exposition of the index may be found in Kaplan and Zingales 
(1997). Higher values of the KZ index imply that the firm is more capital constrained. The 
intuition behind these variables is that firms with high cash flows and large cash balances have 
more internal funds to deploy for new projects and as a result they are less capital constrained 
(Baker et al., 2003). Firms with high dividend payments and low market-to-book have fewer 
growth options and investment opportunities and as a result they do not need as much new 
financing (Lamont et al, 2001). Finally, firms with high leverage are less capable of obtaining 
more debt financing because the probability of default is already high and as a result the cost of 
financing is high as well (Baker et al., 2003). 
We derive the  SA Index  based  on Hadlock and Pierce (2010) using the following  equation:  
SA Index = (-0.737 * Size) + (0.043 * Size^2) - (0.040 * Age), 
where Size is measured as the logged value of inflation adjusted (to 2004) book assets.  
Moreover, the WW Index is based on Whitted and Wu (2006) and derived as follows:  
WW Index = (-0.091 * CF) - (0.062 * DIVPOS) + (0.021 * TLTD) - (0.044 * LNTA) + (0.102 * ISG) - (0.035 * SG), 
where CF is the ratio of cash flow to total assets; DIVPOS is an indicator that takes the value of 
one if the firm pays cash dividends; TLTD is the ratio of the long-term debt to total assets; 43 
 
LNTA is the natural log of total assets, ISG is the firm’s 3-digit industry sales growth;  SG is 
firm sales growth. 
II.  Table: Pearson correlations (N=10,078) 
  Variable  1  2  3  4  5  6 
1  KZ index  1.00           
         
2  No Repurchase Indicator  0.03  1.00         
(0.00)         
3  SA Index  -0.18  0.09  1.00       
(0.00)  (0.00)       
4  WW Index  0.01 
(0.40) 
0.11 
(0.00) 
0.91 
(0.00)  1.00     
5  CSR Index  -0.05 
(0.00) 
-0.04 
(0.00) 
-0.43 
(0.00) 
-0.42 
(0.00)  1.00   
6  Stakeholder Engagement  -0.07 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.70) 
-0.35 
(0.00) 
-0.36  
(0.00) 
0.50 
(0.00)  1.00 
7  CSR Disclosure  -0.12 
(0.00) 
-0.04 
(0.00) 
-0.24 
(0.00) 
-0.25  
(0.00) 
0.68 
(0.00) 
0.39 
(0.00) 
8  Environmental  -0.02 
(0.03) 
-0.06 
(0.00) 
0.47 
(0.00) 
-0.50 
(0.00) 
0.81 
(0.00) 
0.44 
(0.00) 
9  Social  -0.07 
(0.00) 
-0.03 
(0.00) 
-0.44 
(0.00) 
-0.46  
(0.00) 
0.89  0.49 
(0.00)  (0.00) 
10  Corporate Governance  -0.01 
(0.23) 
-0.01 
(0.21) 
-0.09 
(0.00) 
-0.02  
(0.06) 
0.63 
(0.00) 
0.25 
(0.00) 
11  Size  0.18 
(0.00) 
-0.09 
(0.00) 
-1.00 
(0.00) 
-0.92 
(0.00) 
0.43  0.36 
(0.00)  (0.00) 
 
 
  Variable  7  8  9  10  11 
7  CSR Disclosure  1.00         
       
8  Environmental  0.45 
(0.00)  1.00 
 
   
9  Social  0.57 
(0.00) 
0.73 
(0.00)  1.00     
10  Corporate Governance  0.57 
(0.00) 
0.14 
(0.00) 
0.35 
(0.00)  1.00   
11  Size  0.24 
(0.00) 
0.47 
(0.00) 
0.44 
(0.00) 
0.09 
(0.00)  1.00 
 